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Abstract
Assessing potential uptake of agri-environmental schemes based on farm and farmer characteristics 
only results in an incomplete analysis because it neglects the effects of motivational issues of the 
institutional design of contracts, as set up by the government, and of social capital. In this paper we 
describe contract choice using a trivariate probit model and taking into account farm and farmer 
characteristics and motivational issues. Motivational issues in this study include the perception of 
institutional design, the use of extension services, trust in the government, and preferences for stable 
policies. Results show that besides farm and farmer characteristics these factors are important for the 
likelihood of enrolling in agri-environmental contracts. They do not influence every contract type in the 
same way and further decisions to conclude different contract types are connected. If farmers perceive 
the design of an agri-environmental scheme as weak or favour a stable policy they are less likely to 
conclude contracts for biodiversity protection. Farmers who do not trust the government are less likely to 
conclude contracts for less intensive practices. Involvement in general networks increases the probability 
of contracting for wildlife and landscape management and less intensive practices whereas this factor is 
not important for biodiversity protection. The results suggest that taking into account motivational issues 
and differentiating towards different contract types can increase effectiveness and efficiency of agri-
environmental schemes.
Additional keywords: agricultural policy, agri-environmental scheme, contract choice, motivation, trivariate 
probit modelling
Introduction
Preserving nature and landscape, the quality of water, soil, air, and the typical rural 
landscapes is one of the major contemporary challenges for developed countries. 
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Agriculture and forestry, occupying most of the rural area throughout Europe, 
are activities that have a major influence on the European rural environment and 
landscape. The European countryside is mainly man-made, resulting from centuries of 
management of rural areas for production of food, feed, raw materials, and ornamental 
plants. As long as agricultural operations were relatively small in scale, before 
mechanization, scale enlargement, and the increased use of external inputs, there was a 
degree of harmony between agriculture and the countryside in which it operated.
 After 1960, the rising cost of labour induced labour-saving and production-
enhancing techniques that increased agricultural output and helped the dwindling 
numbers of farmers achieve income levels comparable to those outside the agricultural 
sector (Oskam & Slangen, 1998). It resulted in a strong mechanization, intensification 
of land use, strong specialization, farm and scale enlargement and increased use of 
non-factor inputs, such as concentrates, compound feed, fertilizers and pesticides. The 
side effects of these changes have led to a threatening of the quality of water, soil, air, 
nature and landscape.
 While agriculture was experiencing these developments, at the demand side higher 
incomes and levels of welfare increased the demand for wildlife and landscape, as well 
as leisure and outdoor recreation. Changes in demand co-determine changes in the 
institutional environment. This implies that during a period of economic growth and 
the associated evolution of societal preferences, the rules of the game for the agricultural 
sector change. For example, ownership or property rights with respect to the environment 
or landscape, which were traditionally part of agriculture, are now being contested. 
Farmers have to adapt themselves not only to changed price signals, but also to a new 
institutional arrangement giving agriculture its proper place in society. The introduction 
of agri-environmental schemes (AESs) in the EU-member states is one of the changes in 
the rules of the game for the agricultural sector in the last 30 years.
 In the European Union, the introduction of AESs was generally meant to promote a 
more environmentally friendly way of farming. However, AESs influence the behaviour 
of individual farmers in different ways, which can even be different from the intended 
ones. First, not all eligible farmers conclude agri-environmental contracts. Second, 
farmers might be more interested in the payments and could be trying to minimize 
their effort or even not to comply with their contracts in the correct way. To be able 
to design more effective and efficient contracts, policy makers (EU, national, or local) 
aiming at improving the agri-environment have an interest in the reasons why farmers 
choose a specific agri-environmental contract. 
 The purpose of this paper is to explain the factors that determine famers’ motivation 
for the uptake of AESs, taking into account the institutional design of contracts and the 
level of social capital. The institutional design of contracts that is relevant for farmers 
differs across member states and regions in the European Union.
 The first question is whether contract choice depends on farmers’ preferences about 
institutional design of contracts. Designing a contract is a complex task (Bogetoft & 
Olesen, 2002). Governments have to choose from a spectrum of alternative elements 
of design such as eligibility rules, procedures for application, and administration 
requirements. Bogetoft & Olesen (2002) observed that contract parties often design 
contracts without using contract theory. Instead, the design of a contract is based on 
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experience and a process of trial and error. Farmers have their own perception of the 
choices the government makes. If institutional design is perceived as not appropriate, 
farmers are expected to be less likely to conclude any contract even if the operational 
opportunity costs of implementing the measures are negligible. Institutional design 
that fits a transaction adds to the value of a contract whereas inappropriate design 
lowers the value of a contract for the farmer. Depending on the information they have, 
farmers could perceive institutional design differently. Therefore the role of public and 
private extension in AES needs to be taken into account. 
 The second question is what is the role of social capital for the uptake of an AES? 
Social capital manifests itself in participation in agricultural and social networks and 
trust in government and society. Trust can complement government control and 
reduce transaction costs for both the farmer and the government. Trust is an important 
component of social capital. 
 In this paper we shall describe the motivation for different AES contract types, 
using a trivariate probit model where farmers can choose one, two or three types of 
contract, either separately or simultaneously. Perceived institutional design, extension 
services, social capital, and farmers’ characteristics are expected to influence these 
choices differently because transaction characteristics are different. 
 The paper is structured as follows. The next chapter examines theoretically the 
contractual arrangements and the choice of different contract types. Moreover, the role 
of institutional factors in explaining contract choice is discussed. Then the empirical 
model is discussed and an overview of the data is presented. In the chapter thereafter 
the results from the analysis of the contractual arrangement and the estimation results 
and their interpretation are assessed. The last chapter concludes.
Motivations for agri-environmental measures at the farm level
Motivations and contract choice 
Any transaction of the type ‘You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’ – or as a quid 
pro quo – can be considered as a form of contract. If there is a long-term relation 
or a long duration between purchase and delivery (quid and quo), a contract is an 
essential element of the transaction relation (Hart & Holmström, 1987). A contract is 
a commitment to an enforceable mutual agreement recognized by non-interested third 
parties. Generally, a contract specifies the actions each party will take (for example 
the delivery of a good or service by one party and the payment to be made by the other 
party) and may assign decision-making powers (see for instance FitzRoy et al., 1998). 
 Motivation questions arise because individuals have their own private interests, 
which seldom correspond perfectly to the interests of other parties, the group to which 
the individuals belong or society as a whole. Such problems arise because specific 
plans cannot be described in a complete enforceable contract (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992). Concerning motivation, many contracts contain a steering mechanism that 
defines performance criteria and the means to measure performance. Motivation is 
also included in the specification of a reward structure that marks the level of payment 
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if a minimum level of performance is attained. In the psychological literature it is 
argued that there are two kinds of motivation: (1) internal or intrinsic to the individual 
concerned, and (2) external or extrinsic (Le Grand, 2003). The feelings to do your work 
well does every so often not arise from external motivation like payments or direct 
commands but can be viewed as a form of internal motivation. It is also argued that 
there may be a trade-off between the two kinds of motivation, such that too heavy 
emphasis on extrinsic motivation can drive out internal motivation. So motivations 
activated by external factors, such as monetary incentives or direct order (as in 
hierarchical governance structure), can crowd out motivations that are internal to the 
individual (which may or may not include altruistic motivations) (Le Grand, 2003). 
 Several studies apply principal-agent theory to analyse the design of agri-
environmental contracts focusing on hidden information and hidden actions (e.g., 
Ozanne et al., 2001; White, 2002). Other studies focus on the characteristics of farms and 
farmers who conclude agri-environmental contracts (e.g., Crabtree et al., 1998; Beedell 
& Rehman, 2000; Wynn et al., 2001; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Van Wenum, 2002). 
Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2000) developed a simulation model to evaluate the impact of 
agri-environmental programmes on production, management and economic results of 
dairy farms. Peerlings & Polman (2004) used a micro-econometric model to model agri-
environmental contract choice. In their study they took into account transaction costs 
involved in contract choice. Compared with these studies we introduce the factors that are 
important for internal motivation, i.e., public and private extension services, trust in the 
government, perceived institutional design of contracts, and social capital.
 Parties to a contract will choose to conclude or to renew a contract if the expected 
gains from doing so are greater than those of organizing the transaction in some other 
way or having no transaction at all (e.g., Masten, 1996; Masten & Saussier, 2002), or 
formally written as:
  G* = Gi, if Vi > Vj, and     (1)
        = Gj, if Vi ≤ Vj
where Gi represents contract type i, Gj an alternative contract type j, Vi and Vj (the 
farmers beliefs about) the corresponding values of contract type i and alternative j, and 
G* represents the contract type actually chosen. 
 Implementing an AES contract on a farm means that the farmer supplies a service 
to society where the government is the procurer of the service. Because the returns 
farmers expect are difficult to observe, a testable theory of contracting requires that 
the theory relates the benefits and costs of contract types to observable features of the 
transaction (Masten & Saussier, 2002). Therefore, the following relations are added to 
Equation 1:
  Vi = Vi(x,ei)      (2)
  Vj = Vj(x,ej)      (3)
where x represents a vector of observable attributes affecting the motivations for enrolling 
in a specific contract, and ei and ej represent error terms that may reflect either variables 
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omitted (like farm income or attitudes of farmers towards farming (Jongeneel et al., 2008) 
or misperceptions on the part of the contract parties about the true values of Vi and Vj. 
 The model refers to two different contracts but can be extended to three or 
more. Farmers choose (a combination of) contract(s) if the gains from doing so are 
greater than those from another (combination of) contracts(s). Farmers can decide 
simultaneously whether to conclude one or more contracts. The explanatory variables of 
Equations 2 and 3 influence all these decisions. 
Public and private extension services
The importance of providing farmers with information through agricultural extension 
services (e.g., on AES scheme objectives, eligibility, criteria) has been identified as vital 
with regard to shaping farmers’ attitude towards AESs and their traditional farming 
practices, and to agricultural knowledge systems of rural communities. In particular, 
the way in which a farmer finds out about a scheme and how the scheme is ‘sold’ by 
street-level bureaucrats plays an important role in the successful uptake of schemes and 
in the way schemes are viewed by farmers (Wilson & Hart, 2001). 
 Morris et al. (2000) show that many arable farmers offered the generic type of 
resistance to agro-environmental schemes often in association with objection in 
principle to perceived constraints on freedom to farm, which was strengthened by 
lack of knowledge of the scheme. Furthermore, there were quite a number of non-
participants whose potential enrolment was constrained by inadequate or incorrect 
information. Public and private extension services can help to overcome these 
information asymmetries. Morris et al. (2000) argue that participation can be enhanced 
by a purposeful promotion campaign and possible modification of scheme design. In 
our study we distinguish between both types of extension services because their role 
is different. Public extension services can be expected to inform farmers in a different 
way because they are connected to policy. Public extension may lead to lower costs, 
for example farmers may have a better understanding of what is required from them 
(see Falconer, 2000). Private extension services are often linked to organizations like 
suppliers, processing industries, fiscal advisors, and banks. Private extension focuses 
for instance on the improvement of dairy production or are dealing with investments. 
Trust in government and institutional design
The use of contracts will serve different purposes. In some cases contracts may be 
used chiefly to assure technical compliance with needs. In other cases contracts may 
seek to control opportunism or shirking. It is clear that in either case a level of trust 
may also be required in order to establish a relationship at all, before a contract could 
be used (Bennet & Robson, 2004). In general, the economic function of trust refers 
to the reduction of transaction costs and its influence on promoting co-operation and 
reducing the need (costs) for intervention to prevent or correct dishonesty (e.g., James 
& Sykuta, 2005). Klein-Woolthuis et al. (2005) give three interpretations of trust. First, 
within transaction cost economics and contract theory, contracts are a basis for trust. 
Contracting partners are limited, because they have no other option than to behave 
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trustworthily (opportunism will be at the expense of sanctions). Here contract and trust 
are positively related with contract as a prerequisite for trust. Second, social scientists 
often envisage contracts as being in conflict with trust. Third, contracts can be negatively 
related with trust, thereby decreasing or eliminating the need for control or contracts 
(Klein-Woolthuis, 1999; Nooteboom, 2002). In this paper we adopt a narrow definition 
of trust entailing the expectation that the government will not engage in opportunistic 
behaviour, even in the face of opportunities and incentives for opportunism, irrespective 
of the ability to monitor or control farmers (see also Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). This 
definition is felt to indicate what most people would call ‘real trust’. 
 Motivation of farmers to participate in AESs can also be derived from 
trustworthiness and reputation of the government. AESs are contracts between farmers 
and the government and contracts are a two-sided mechanism. Both parties have to 
build up reputation and trust. A low level of trust of farmers in the government or 
a low reputation of the government has important consequences for the uptake of 
contracts. Important in this context is time inconsistency (Kydland & Prescott, 1977). 
This phenomenon, which can be considered as a kind of hidden action, refers to a 
government’s propensity to modify policy or the rules of the game of the institutional 
environment, and people’s awareness of the likelihood and implications of this. It 
affects commitment and creates a negative influence on the uptake of contracts, 
especially long-term ones. 
 Yang & Holzer (2006) discuss a number of arguments that could lead to difficulties 
in analysing the link between the performance of governments and trust in these 
governments. Applying these arguments to AESs leads to the following dimensions of 
trust between farmers and the government: (1) Farmers may have different expectations 
of what kind of AES the government should provide. As a result, their reactions to 
the same level of actual performance with respect to the institutional quality of AES 
design may be very different. It is not the actual performance that matters but the gap 
between expectation and performance. (2) Farmers may have negative perceptions 
regardless of how government is actually performing. (3) Government performance is 
produced collectively by a number of agencies but some agencies feature more strongly 
in farmers’ image of government, like for instance the parliament. (4) Performance 
with respect to AESs is not the only criterion that farmers use to evaluate government. 
(5) For some issues bad governance leads to distrust but good governance tends to go 
unnoticed. Although these aspects have relevance, surveys show that citizens are able to 
assess the performance of public services in a rather objective way, without constantly 
referring to stereotypes. 
 Trust in government, parliament, or the civil service has received increased 
attention in recent years (Bouckart & Van Der Walle, 2003). These authors show that 
there may always be a certain cultural/political bias in trust attributes. The factors 
determining trust in government are not necessarily the same for every country 
or political culture and may vary over time. Several studies have shown that the 
institutional environment matters for the variability of contracts in relation to their 
transactions, that there are different arrangements in the same environment, and that 
the institutional environment influences the performance and duration of contracts 
(e.g., Ménard, 2000). It is not easy to obtain measures of relevant dimensions of the 
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institutional environment in order to isolate its impact on institutional arrangements 
(e.g., Oxley, 1999). For a country, trust in the administration responsible for 
AESs indicates congruence between farmers’ preferences and the perceived actual 
functioning of the government in that country. 
 Assessment of AES contract requirements and of the effects of the contracts in 
terms of uptake and environmental effectiveness merely results in an incomplete 
analysis because it assumes that the design of the AES programme as set up by the 
European Union and national government is optimal. In this paper we shall focus on 
the perception of institutional design by farmers as explanatory factor for the uptake 
of AESs. Perceptions are used because farmers only observe part of the institutional 
design. If farmers perceive that the institutional design of contracts is weak they are 
less likely to conclude agri-environmental contracts.
Self-interest and social capital  
Building-in self-interest means that people are doing things that are of interest 
to themselves. Such interests can vary from financial benefits to responsible 
entrepreneurship. The understanding of responsible entrepreneurship is fully on the move 
and is related to a varied and complex phenomenon. In general, self-interest can be 
understood to mean that a farmer should not only think in terms of the economic 
value of the firm (mostly represented by the profit of the farm). He should also 
consider social and ecological values as a result of the farm’s activities in terms of 
social and ecological quantities. This is indicated by the ‘Triple-P bottom line’. The 
three P’s stand for People, Planet and Profit, i.e., the extent to which farms are able 
to realize sustainable developments from an economic (Profit), ecological (Planet), 
and societal (People) point of view. From this viewpoint, farms function in a socially 
responsible manner (responsible entrepreneurship) if the economic, social and ecological 
values that they produce fulfil the expectations of the stakeholders. Satisfying the 
social and ecological criteria actually creates a ‘permit’ to carry out farming activities 
(Van Huylenbroeck & Slangen, 2003). Concerning the social aspect of responsible 
entrepreneurship, farmers participating in social networks like sports clubs or clubs 
focused on community work are often more likely to participate because of their values. 
This can be driven by internal motives or social capital. 
 Social capital is “the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and 
expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of individuals bring to a 
recurrent activity” (Ostrom, 2000). Trust is perhaps the most important component 
of social capital. If one’s confidence in an enforcement agency falters, one does not 
trust people to fulfil their agreements and agreements are not entered into (Dasgupta, 
2000). In addition to trust, other elements of social capital include social norms, 
or behavioural strategies subscribed to by everyone in society, and networks of civic 
engagement (e.g., membership of a swimming club or religious community) that 
enhance co-operation. Higher participation in societal activities, such as being a passive 
– but especially an active – member of (agricultural or non-agricultural) organizations 
are indicators for higher levels of social capital (e.g., Beugelsdijk, 2003). Social capital 
could lead to lower transaction costs or change attitudes towards the agri-environment. 
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An example can be found in Landcare group networks in Australia. The concept of 
social capital explains, at least in part, the apparent success of such networks (e.g., 
Sobels et al., 2001).  
 The literature is far from unambiguous and consistent in defining social capital 
for empirical analysis (Beugelsdijk, 2003). For this reason we have to specify social 
capital. In this paper we shall use the individual level of social capital. At the individual 
level social capital relates to network resources and is thought of as a set of resources 
embedded in relationships (Beugelsdijk, 2003). At the individual level, trust is an 
element that is necessary for the existence of social capital. Several studies have shown 
the importance of trust in a society for economic transactions (Beugelsdijk, 2003). This 
type of trust is different from trust in a contracting partner where trust is focused on a 
single person or organization like the government. 
 Group membership is the second element of social capital included in this paper. 
The economic function of associational activity contains two elements (Beugelsdijk, 
2003). The first element refers to the concept of collective action and argues that 
organized group behaviour leads to the generally shared idea that the pursuit of 
collective goods is not seen as contradictory to the achievement of personal wealth. 
Associational activity limits the costs of free riding. The second element, embeddedness 
in networks (group membership), promotes the spillover of knowledge and information 
between the different actors involved. Farmer networking could be important to the 
overall running costs of AESs (e.g., Falconer, 2000). Falconer (2000) argues, for 
example, that scheme participation may be promoted by friends and neighbours, which 
may also have a positive impact in terms of allowing reduction in the public costs of 
scheme promotion. Examples of such networks are environmental co-operatives in the 
Netherlands, in which farmers exchange information and are collectively involved in 
AESs. Some networks are not only for exchanging information but are in fact part of 
an institutional arrangement to participate in AESs and are therefore not exogenous 
like groups of farmers involved in contracting AESs. In this paper we look at the 
participation in groups of farmers who do focus on improving agriculture practices that 
are not directly linked to AESs. 
Empirical model and data
The econometric method applied to the aforementioned theoretical model is a trivariate 
probit model. This technique (Capellari & Jenkins, 2003; Greene, 2003) enables us 
to model farmers’ decisions to take up more than one contract at a time. Since the 
outcomes are treated as binary variables, any combination of contracts is possible. The 
contracts can be complements rather than just substitutes. Unlike the multinomial 
model the equation can vary across outcomes. The multivariate model applies 
when several decisions may be interdependent or may depend on a common set of 
explanatory variables:
ν* = ν* = ν* =   (4)
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 0 otherwise
 1 if X1β1 + ε1 > 0
 0 otherwise
 1 if X2β2 + ε2 > 0
  0 otherwise
  1 if X3β3 + ε3 > 0
1 2 3
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where ν1, ν2 and ν3 are binary variables; X1, X2 and X3 are explanatory variables; β1, β2
and β3 are regression coefficients; ε1, ε2 and ε3 are error terms. 
 This three-equation model is featured by correlated disturbances, which (due 
to identification reasons) are assumed to follow a normal distribution (variance is 
normalized to unity). That is:
  E[ε1] = E[ε2] = E[ε3] = 0     (5)
  cov[ε1, ε2, ε3] = ρ = {ρ1,2, ρ1,3, ρ2,3,}
  var[ε1] = var[ε2] = var[ε3] = 1
where ρ is a vector of correlation parameters denoting the extent to which the error 
terms co-vary. Should covariation be the case, we need to estimate the three equations 
jointly, following a trivariate normal distribution: {ε1, ε2, ε3} = φ3 (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, ρ). 
 As long as we are interested in simultaneous decisions, we need to define the joint 
probability. For example, the probability of observing the three decisions taking place at 
the same time (ν1 = 1, ν2 = 1, ν3 = 1) would be:
  Pr(ν1 = 1, ν2 = 1, ν3 = 1) = ⌠ ⌠ ⌠φ3(X1iβ1, X2iβ2', X3iβ3, ρ)dε1dε2dε3 = (6)
  φ3(X1iβ1, X2iβ2', X3iβ3, ρ)dε1dε2dε3
 As in the standard probit model, observations contribute some combination of Pr(νk = 1)
for k{1,2,3}, depending on their specific values on those variables. The log-likelihood 
is then just a sum across the eight possible contracting variables (that is, eight 
possible combinations of successes (νk = 1) and failures (νk = 0) times their associated 
probabilities (Greene, 2003). These probabilities may be drawn from Equation (6) as 
well. The most relevant coefficients estimated in the model are β1, β2, β3 and ρ(ρ1,2, ρ1,3,
ρ2,3). The latter, if significantly different from 0, will evaluate to which extent each pair 
of decisions is interrelated. The Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane simulator (GHK) is used 
to approximate those integrals. See Capellari & Jenkins (2003) and Greene (2003) for a 
brief description of the GHK.
Data
In 2005, face-to-face surveys were carried out in the following areas: Fryslân (the 
Netherlands), Flanders (Belgium), Czech Republic, Finland, Basse-Normandie (France), 
and Emilia Romagna (Italy). A total of 990 farmers were interviewed. In order to obtain 
better information on agri-environmental contracts, contracting farmers were willfully 
over-represented in the sample. In the Netherlands and France grassland was the most 
important form of land use, in Belgium it was a mixture of grassland and arable land, 
and in Finland and Italy arable land was most important.  The questionnaire used 
addressed issues concerning the farm, the farmer’s perception of agri-environmental 
contracts, information on income, social capital, motivational issues and hobbies. 
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Table 1. Data for the average farm in 2005 (n = 990).
Variable Description Average  SD 1
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Contracting type 0 = no contract
 1 = landscape management (area based) 0.16
 2 = biodiversity protection 0.26
 3 = restriction of intensive practices 0.25
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Farm characteristics
Specialization dairy farming Farm type dairy (percentage SGM 2 in dairy). 29.81 30.02
Specialization beef farming Farm type beef cattle (percentage SGM in beef 1.72 5.11
 production (grazing cattle).
Farm size Farm size (total number of SGM ∑ 1000). 14.64 42.76
Trajectory Dynamics in current farming (number of changes 3.25 1.85
in farming practices not related to AES).
Future Future of farm (dummy indicating whether farm 0.87
 is expected to be continued in the next 10 years).
Intensity Intensity of farm (measured in SGM per ha). 0.37 1.64
Farmer characteristics
Age between 40 and 55, and Dummy age farm head between 40 and 55 and  0.23/0.50
age older than 55 older than 55 (age of farm head or average age 
in case of more than one farm head).
Medium education and  Dummy education medium level and high level  0.80/0.14
high education (education of farm head or highest education 
in case of more farm heads).
Off-farm income Dummy off-farm labour income (off-farm 0.13
employment) is more than 50%.
Extension services
Public extension Dummy indicating that farmer often receives public  0.60
 extension.
Private extension Dummy indicating that farmer often receives private 0.66
 extension.
Trust in government and institutional design
Trust government Dummy indicating that ‘The ...... can be trusted’ where 0.64
 ..... stands for agricultural administration, environmental
 administration, or EU (average score of Likert scales).
Institutional design Average score on six items on a Likert scale related to 2.58 0.49
 institutional design.
 – ‘The eligibility rules are fair’.
 – ‘The procedures for application are easy’.
 – ‘The rules and requirements are easy to understand’.
 – ’The intended environmental benefits are clear and easy 
 to understand’.
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In addition, farmers were asked about how they managed their contracts and their 
required farming practices. 
 From the questionnaire several variables were derived. They described the farming 
family (education level and age), their production system (e.g., farm legal status, farm 
size in Standard Gross Margins (SGM; for definition see Table 1)) the use of extension 
services, trust in the government and institutional design, and social capital (trust and 
participation in networks). The latter three sets of variables are important motivation 
variables. Table 1 gives an overview of the data used for the estimation.
 We distinguished three groups of contracts: (1) focusing on landscape management, 
(2) on biodiversity protection, and (3) on the restriction of intensive practices (Bonnieux 
et al., 2002). These groups were homogeneous with respect to the type of contract 
Table 1 (cont’d).
Variable Description Average  SD 1
 – ‘It is easy to find the right person in the 
  administration to contact when there are problems’.
 – ‘Regarding AES, administration behaviour is fair 
  and responsible’.
Preference stable policy Dummy indicating that farmers believe that the current 0.25
 policy rules and regulations will remain constant 
over a longer period.
Social capital
Trust general Dummy indicating that ‘Generally speaking, most 0.74
people can be trusted.’
Participation social  Dummy indicating that farmer often participates in 0.42
organizations activities of non-agricultural organizations like sports
 clubs and clubs focused on community work.
Participation agricultural Dummy indicating that farmer often participates in 0.31
organizations agricultural organization (farmers union and local farmers’
 groups mainly oriented at improving agriculture).
Case study area dummies
Fryslân (the Netherlands) Dummy indicating case study area Fryslân. 0.12
Flanders (Belgium)  Dummy indicating case study area Flanders. 0.24
Czech Republic Dummy indicating case study area Czech Republic. 0.15
Finland Dummy indicating case study area Finland. 0.09
Basse-Normandie (France) Dummy indicating case study area Basse-Normandie. 0.27
Emilia Romagna (Italy) Dummy indicating case study area Emilia Romagna. 0.13
1 SD = standard deviation.
2 SGM =  The Standard Gross Margin (SGM) of a crop or livestock unit is defined as the value of output 
 from one hectare or from one animal minus the cost of variable inputs required to produce that output. 
 For each region all crop and livestock units are accorded an SGM. To avoid bias caused by fluctuations, 
 e.g., in production (due to bad weather) or in input/output prices, three-year averages are taken.
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requirements. Landscape management focused on the maintenance of landscape 
elements. Biodiversity protection referred to extensive management of grassland and 
management to promote flora and fauna. Winter cover on arable land and reduced use 
of fertilizers are examples of the restriction of intensive practices.  
 Farm and farmer characteristics are relevant for the uptake of AESs. From previous 
studies it follows that farm size and farm type influence the uptake of AESs (e.g., Wynn 
et al., 2001; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). The type of service delivered by the farmer 
varies according to the farming system. Implementing a biodiversity protection contract 
on a specialized dairy farm will be different from implementing the same contract on 
a specialized arable farm. Farmers who develop their farm in a direction not related to 
AESs are expected to be less willing to be involved in agri-environmental contracts. Also 
Wynn et al. (2001) show the importance of the ‘fit’ of the scheme with the farm. 
 Based on the literature, we included a number of farmer characteristics in the 
model (e.g., Wilson, 1997; Rizov, 2004). Dummy variables for age and education were 
added to the model. Reference categories for age and education were dropped from the 
model in order to avoid a dummy trap (Woolridge, 2006). Moreover, a variable for off-
farm income was added to represent labour availability. According to Jongeneel et al. 
(2008) it was expected that if non-farming income is important a farmer is more likely 
to enroll in agri-environmental schemes. 
 Private as well as public extension services are expected to influence uptake. 
The questions on extension services did not focus on AESs and were formulated in 
general terms. It can be expected that information on AESs was only part of these 
extension services. Private extension is provided by feed suppliers, banks, researchers, 
and processing industries. Public extension will include the complete range of 
governmental regulation including AESs so that a positive influence is expected on 
the uptake of AES. Given the nature of private extension (focused on general farming 
practices) it is expected that this will negatively influence the uptake of AES. A positive 
assessment of institutional design is expected to increase the uptake of AES. 
 Social capital is measured using the following indicators: (1) trust in general, (2) 
participation in social networks, and (3) participation in agricultural networks. Higher 
levels of trust in general and trust in the government in particular (as contracting partner) 
are expected to enhance the uptake. The social networks are more general networks not 
related to agriculture but, for example, to involvement in sports clubs. Agricultural networks 
focus on improving agricultural practices. The more general networks are thought to 
increase the probability of uptake of AESs because the farmers concerned feel a large social 
responsibility. Participation in agricultural networks is expected to negatively influence 
uptake because the farmers are more oriented towards improving agricultural operation. 
 Country specificities, including characteristics of sampling in each case study, were 
taken into account through country dummies. The dummies were introduced as control 
variables. The Netherlands was taken as reference. 
Results 
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 2. The likelihood of participation 
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Table 2. Estimation results of multivariate probit model (n = 990).
Independent variable Landscape Biodiversity Restriction of
 management protection intensive practices
Farm characteristics
Specialization dairy farming 0.0015  0.0047 ** –0.0058 ***
Specialization beef farming –0.094 0.0032 0.0035
Farm size –0.0015 –0.0018 –0.0012
Trajectory 0.058 ** 0.042 0.083 ***
Future –0.061  0.073  –0.034
Intensity –0.030
Farmer characteristics
Age between 40 and 55 0.053 –0.12 –0.083
Age older than 55 –0.046 –0.050 –0.35 ***
Medium education 0.073 0.11 0.083
High education 0.13 0.095 0.15
Off-farm income 0.031 0.029 0.32 **
Extension services
Public extension 0.25 ** 0.19 * 0.36 ***
Private extension 0.15 –0.16 –0.17 *
Trust in government and institutional design
Trust government –0.011 –0.022 0.21 **
Institutional design 0.15 0.45 *** 0.12 ***
Preference stable policy 0.050 0.38 *** 0.037
Social capital
Trust general –0.014 0.018 –0.012
Participation social organizations  0.24 ** 0.082  0.27 ***
Participation agricultural –0.25** –0.15 * –0.28 ***
organizations
Case-study area dummies
Flanders (Belgium) –0.00054 –0.089 0.25
Czech Republic –0.19 –1.90 *** 0.022
Finland –1.49 *** –0.84 *** 0.75 ***
Basse-Normandie (France) 0.24 0.080 –0.50 ***
Emilia Romagna (Italy) 0.039 –1.10 *** –0.48 ** 
----------------------------------------
Constant –1.89 *** –2.02 *** –0.80 *
1  Statistical significance: * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P < 0.01. 
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in landscape management and biodiversity protection is positively related to 
specialization in dairy farming. Specialized dairy farmers are less likely to be involved 
in less intensive practices. The trajectory of the farm – the number of changes in 
farming practices not related to AES – has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
enrolling in landscape management and restriction of intensive practices. The intensity 
of the farm has no effect on the uptake of landscape management contracts (this 
variable was not included in the other equations). The future of the farm (whether the 
farmer expects his farm to be continued for the coming 10 years) has no statistically 
significant effect. Older farmers are less likely to enroll in contracts for restricting 
intensive practices. A large share of off-farm labour income makes contracts for 
restricting intensive practices more likely.  
 The perception of the institutional design has positive effects on participation in 
biodiversity and less intensive practices contracts. If farmers think that a stable policy is 
important they are more likely to be involved in biodiversity protection. 
 Trust in general has no effect on participation. Trust in the government only 
favours participation of farmers in contracts for restrictions on intensive practices. 
Participation in social organizations has positive effects on uptake of landscape 
maintenance and restriction on intensive practices contracts. Participation in 
organizations focused on improving farming has a negative impact on enrolling for 
the same contract types. Public extension services positively influence the uptake of 
all contract types. Furthermore, private extension services have a negative effect on 
the uptake of restricting intensive practices contracts. Farm size, intensity, and the 
future of the farm have no effect. A stable policy – i.e., no time inconsistency of the 
government – has a positive effect on participation for biodiversity protection contracts. 
The country dummies illustrate differences related to case-study specific factors such 
as the regional institutional environment, history and geographical characteristics of 
a case study area. We find evidence of correlation between the contracting decisions: 
the error terms between landscape management and biodiversity protection (ρ1,2) 
are positively correlated and the error terms between biodiversity protection and 
restriction of intensive practices (ρ1,3) are positively correlated. Finally, the error terms 
between biodiversity protection and restriction of intensive practices are positively 
correlated (ρ2,3). The correlation coefficients are respectively 0.41, 0.38 and 0.38. 
These coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The likelihood ratio test 
statistics suggest that ρ1,2 = ρ1,3 = ρ2,3 can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level 
(LR–χ2= 105.61).
Discussion and conclusions
Contract choice was described and analysed using a trivariate probit model. The model 
examined the influence of farmer and farm characteristics and motivational factors like 
institutional design of contracts, extension services, and social capital, to identify statistically 
significant variables related to the adoption of different contract types. Our results confirm 
earlier findings about the influence of farm and farmers’ characteristics on the uptake of 
agri-environmental contracts (e.g., Crabtree et al., 1998; Wynn et al., 2001). 
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Most previous studies did not take into account motivational aspects about institutional 
design and social capital. First of all, these variables significantly affect the choice 
of some contract types but do not influence the choice of other ones. For example, 
participation in social networks is important for landscape management and for 
restrictions on intensive land use practices but is not important for biodiversity 
protection. Secondly, decisions to participate in more than one contract type are not 
taken independently. Farmers combine different contract types. 
 The results of the analysis are important in terms of policy design. They indicate 
that the implementation of a restricted intensive practices contract on specialized dairy 
farms is different from that on less specialized farms. This suggests that contracts have 
to be clearly targeted to well-specified transactions and have to take the characteristics 
of the farm and the farmer into account. This will increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the policy. 
 The results show the importance of institutional design. A negative farmer’s 
perception of the institutional design can prevent him from contracting. The results 
furthermore suggest that public extension services can enhance the uptake and 
overcome negative perceptions. To enhance the uptake extension services should focus 
on the way AESs are being perceived. Trust in the government also increases uptake. 
Trust is a necessary condition of contracting, a conclusion that is in line with Klein 
Woolthuis et al. (2005). It means that well designed contracts cannot completely replace 
a lack of trust of farmers in the government. In short, the uptake can be increased by 
paying more attention to the motivational aspects of the institutional design of the 
contracts and by maintaining and developing trustworthiness. 
 Finally, our paper shows the importance of social capital for the uptake of AESs. 
Farmers who are frequently engaged in non-agricultural networks are more likely to 
be involved in AES. This implies that not only financial concerns are important for the 
uptake of agri-environmental schemes but also that farmers are influenced by their 
social networks, underlining the importance of internal motivation and responsible 
entrepreneurship and showing the importance of non-monetary benefits of being 
involved in AESs. Farmers who only participate in general farming networks are less 
likely to be involved in AES. Apparently, they have other preferences.  
 The analysis is subject to some qualifications. First, we only modelled a limited 
number of different contract types. Besides, only groups of similar contracts with 
different characteristics were analysed. This could have led to aggregation errors. 
Second, other factors, e.g., preferences for contract terms like contract duration and 
payment levels not included in the model, might have played a role in contract choice. 
 Despite these qualifications the approach discussed contributes to the existing 
literature because it makes it possible to determine the farmers’ choice between 
different contract types. It introduces institutional preferences, public extension 
services, trust in the government and social capital. Given the farm-specific/contract-
specific outcomes, the survey and model can help to better understand reasons why 
farms conclude a specific contract. This information is relevant given the larger 
emphasis the EU is putting on quantifying the effects of agri-environmental policies. 
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This paper presents results obtained within the EU project SSPE-CT-2003-502070 on Integrated Tools to 
design and implement Agro Environmental Schemes (ITAES) <http//:merlin.lusignan.inra.fr/ITAES>. 
The survey referred to in this paper was carried out within this project. The authors’ conclusions do not 
necessarily reflect the view of the European Union and in no way anticipate the Commission’s future 
policy in this area.
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